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Abstract 
This paper develops the formal foundations of semantic theories dealing with various kinds of 
nominalisations. It  introduces  a  combination of an  event-calculus with  a type-free theory 
which  allows a  compositional  description to  be  given  of  such phenomena  like  Vendler's 
distinction between  perfect  and  imperfect  nominals,  iteration  of  gerunds  and  Cresswell's 
notorious non-urrival of'the train examples. Moreover, the approach argued for in this paper 
allows a semantic explanation to be given for a wide range of grammatical observations such 
as the  behaviour  of  certain tpes of  nominals with  respect to their  verbal contexts or  the 
distribution of negation in nominals. 
1  Introduction 
In chapter five of his book Linguistics in Philosophy, Zeno Vendler (Vendler 1967) discusses 
two classes of nominalised predicates, the class of perfect and the class of imperfect nominals, 
and further two types of verbal contexts which either do or do not admit these nominals as 
arguments.  Vendler  argues in  support  of the  thesis  that  a  genuine  semantic difference is 
responsible for many of his observations. The nominals he investigates are assumed to denote, 
in different categories, the category of events for one class of nominals and the category of 
fucts,  results, or propositions  for the other. In his work  Vendler does not provide precise 
definitions of these concepts but introduces them by way of example. However, we entertain 
the thesis  that  his  observations  are  central  for any  semantic  theory  dealing  with  natural 
language nominalisations. Therefore, in the sections to follow we will first briefly summarise 
Vendler's  findings and related ones and then introduce the formal tools which we think are 
required  for  the  foundations  of  a  general  semantics  of  nominalisations  which  claims 
explanatory value. Roughly, these tools consist of an event-calculus which allows a formal 
account to be given of the difference between  events and  facts etc. and  a system which is 
capable  of transforming  sentences  and predicates  into  terms,  thus  providing  a  theory  of 
reification.  It  is  the  combination  of  the  two  systems  that  allows  the  development  of 
explanatorily adequate logical representations for the data. Hence, in the last sections we will 
put the machinery thus developed to work  and  show how to derive semantically adequate 
explanations for a series of observations mainly from Vendler. The central purpose, however, 
is to show by analysing puzzling examples that the tools introduced are suited to forming the 
basis of a general theory of the semantic part of natural language nominalisations. 
In  the  following  two  sections,  we  introduce  the  most  important  characteristics  of 
Vendler's observations and philosophical claims. 
2  Two Types of Nominalisations 
2.1 Perfect and Imperfect Nominals 
Vendler's  differentiation between perfect and imperfect nominals and his observations about 
their  most  important  properties  are illustrated  in  the  following  two  groups  of  examples. 
Perfect nominals occur with determiners, can be modified by adjectives but not by adverbs, 
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and  cannot  appear in  different  tenses  or be modalised. Further,  it  is  impossible  to negate 
perfect  nominals. To summarise, perfect  nominals are nominalised  forms which  have  lost 
their verbal characteristics and behave like "real"  nouns. This is why Vendler dubbed them 
perfect. 
(1)  (a)  the singing of the song 
(b)  beautiful singing of the song 
(c)  *quickly cooking of the dinner 
(d)  *having cooked of the dinner 
(e)  *being able to cook of the dinner 
(f)  *not revealing of the secret 
Imperfect nominals show the opposite behaviour, as the examples in (2) demonstrate.  They 
cannot  occur  with  nominal  determiners,  they  can  be  modified  by  adverbs'  but  not  by 
adjectives,  they can occur in different tenses, they can be modalised,  and it is possible to 
negate them. 
(2)  (a)  *the singing the song 
(b)  *beautiful singing the song 
(c)  singing the song beautifully 
(d)  quickly cooking the dinner 
(e)  having cooked the dinner 
(f)  being able to cook the dinner 
(g)  not revealing the secret 
Hence, imperfect nominals can occur externally in noun phrase positions, but  their internal 
structure strongly resembles the structure of the VP or the S they are derived from. This is, of 
course, the reason  why Vendler called  them  imperfect. We  shall henceforth  use the  term 
perfect or imperfect nominal both for the respective nominal and for the NP which contains 
such a nominal. 
Abney (1987) develops a detailed syntactic account of gerunds, which are part of the 
class of perfect and imperfect nominals. He distinguishes four classes of gerunds: 
(3)  (a)  Ace-ing: John being a spy. 
(b)  PRO-ing:  singing loudly. 
(c)  Poss-ing: John's knowing the answer. 
(d)  Ing-oj singing of the song. 
Assuming that PRO-ing is a special  case of Acc-ing  or Poss-ing,  there are three classes of 
gerunds, which differ with respect to their syntactic properties. For example, Abney shows 
that  Acc-ing  and  Pass-ing  constructions  show  differences with  regard  to  agreement, long 
distance binding, pied  piping, etc. But what about semantic differences?  Of course, Ing-of 
gcrunds and Poss-ing gerunds are among the perfect and imperfect'  nominals introduced in 
this  section,  and  Vendler's  thesis  is  that  there  is  a  category  distinction,  i.e.  something 
I They can therefore occur with adverbial determiners like a1wc1y.s. 
2 The concepts perfect and imperfect nominal are used by Vendler primarily to refer to sets of structural 
properties which are assumed to be conditioned by two different semantic types. This is especially clear when 
imperfect nominals are considered. This is a huge and st~ucturally  heterogeneous class including Poss-ing, Acc- 
ing gerunds, absolutive constr~~ctions,  infinitives and even that-clauses, which are traditionally not thought of as 
~lon~inal  at all. Perfect nominals, however, are more coherent. This class contains Ing-of gerunds and some 
derived nominals like blizzilrri etc. genuinely semantic, involved with these notions. In thls paper it will be assumed that Acc-ing 
and Poss-ing constructions are semantically in the same class, the class of imperfect nominals. 
Vendler  (1968)  demonstrates  that  the  genitive  in  Poss-ing  gerunds  is  not  a  "real" 
genitive like John's in John's house. This is shown by the following examples: 
(4)  (a)  John's house 
(b)  the house of John 
(c)  John's singing the song 
(d)  *the singing the song of (by) John 
(e)  the singing of the song by John 
Example (4b) is a paraphrase of (4a). An analogous paraphrase for (4c) does not exist. 
Compared with the genitive of imperfect nominals the genitive of perfect nominals behaves 
like a "real" genitive. This is also shown by the following observation: It is possible to delete 
the genitive of embedded imperfect nominals if  it is coreferential  with the matrix subject. 
Deletion in the case of perfect nominals, however, leads to ungrammaticality. 
(5)  (a)  He shocked us by telling a dirty joke. 
(b)  *He entertained us by singing of arias. (Vendler 1968: 50) 
We  therefore  will  analyse the genitive in  Poss-ing  constructions in  the same way  as the 
subjects of Acc-ing gerunds. For more arguments in  favour of the claim that the genitive of 
Poss-ing gerunds is not the same as the genitive in Ing-of nominals, see Vendler (1968). 
2.2 Narrow and Loose Containers 
Vendler also considers verbal contexts, which somehow discriminate between the above two 
classes  of  nominals.  Expressions  like  surprised  us,  is  unlikely  are  examples  of  loose 
containers. Their name  derives from the  fact that  they  accept both kinds of nominals as 
arguments, as shown in (6). 
(6)  (a)  The beautiful singing of the aria surprised us. 
(b)  John's not revealing the secret is unlikely. 
(c)  The singing of the song is fun. 
(d)  John's quickly cooking the dinner surprised us. 
(e)  They were surprised by the sudden coming in of a stranger'. 
Verbal  contexts  like was slow, occurred, etc., which  are  called  narrow by  Vendler,  show 
more restrictive behaviour. They accept as arguments only perfect oominals, as shown in (7). 
(7)  (a)  *The soprano's singing the aria was slow. 
(b)  The soprano's singing of the aria was slow. 
(c)  John's  revealing of the secret occurred at midnight. 
(d)  *John's revealing the secret occurred at midnight. 
(c)  *John's not revealing the secret occurred at midnight 
Narrow  containers can be  negated,  and they stay narrow  under  negation,  as the following 
examples demonstrate. 
(8)  (a)  The singing of the song didn't occur at noon. 
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(b)  *John's kicking the cat didn't occur at noon. 
As already mentioned, negations of perfect  nominals  are usually bad, but  they may  occur 
marginally as in the following example from R. Cooper: 
(9)  ?Andrew's not stopping for the traffic light took place at noon 
But  note that  even  if  example  (9) is acceptable, the  negation  will not  be  interpreted in  a 
classical way  but  as  an  antonym,  i.e. similar to  E.  Engdahl's  example  concerning  naked 
infinitive complements of perception verbs. 
(1 0)  The policeman saw Andrew not stop for the traffic light 
Antonymic negation  is characterised by the  following pair of conditions, where  signifies 
classical negation and -  antonymic negation: 
-cp  +~cp  but not ~cp  -+ -cp 
From the fact that x is black we certainly are allowed to conclude that x is not white, but by no 
means can we conclude from the fact that x is not white that x is black. 
Note that the nominals arrival of the train and non-arrival of the trcrin in the following 
examples, though  similar to perfect  and imperfect  nominals in  many respects, nevertheless 
behave differently.  It  may well  be that arrivcrl  of the trcrin  is a perfect  nominal, but  non- 
arrival ofthe train is not an imperfect nominal in Vendler's sense because it can occur with 
nominal determiners and adjectives but not with adverbs. 
(1 1)  (a)  The arrival of the train surprised us. 
(b)  The non-arrival of the train surprised us. 
(c)  The arrival of the train occurred at noon. 
(d)  *The non-arrival of the train occurred at noon 
(e)  the unexpected non-arrival of the train 
(g)  *the non-arrival of the train unexpectedly 
In Russian4, nominalisations  like penie  (singing), otkrytie (discovery) prichod  (arrival) and 
sohljutlenie  (respecting) show similar behaviour to English perfect nominals. For example, 
these  nominals do not  express temporal  or modal  differentiations. However,  they  can be 
negated with the prefix ize, which for instance results in the noun nesobljudenie. The meaning 
of nesohljudenie is a very strong form of negation which is similar to the marginal English not 
stopping for  the trcgjc light; i.e. ne is interpreted as an antonymic negation. However, Ilse 
Zimmermann informed  us  that nesohljuclenie can also be similar to the non in the English 
phrase non-arrival ofthe train, which - as will be shown in section 5.4 - results in a much 
more complicated interaction of different kinds of negation. But this second reading seems to 
be less prominent. 
Antonym-like  negations  occur not  only in nominalisations.  For  example,  as  already 
~i~entioned,  certain  perception  verb  complements  show  similar  behaviour  under  negation. 
Moreover,  this  kind  of  negation  is  observed  in  the  context  of  so-called  Neg-Raising 
constructions. 
4 We thank Katja Jasinskaja and Ilse Zimmermann for informing us about the negation of Russian 
nominalisations. For more information about negation and nominalisation in Russian, the reader is referred to 
Zimmermann (1988) Fonnul Fo~mrlr~fions,for  Semuntic Theories ofNominali.sotion 
(12)  (a)  Daniel does not claim that Louise came 
(b)  Daniel claims that Louise didn't come. 
The negation occurring in (12b) is not interpreted in a classical way but as an antonym; (12a) 
may be ambiguous between the two readings. For an analysis of Neg-Raising structures using 
negation as failure, see Tovena (2001). 
Narrow  containers  are typical  examples  of extensional contexts  in  contrast  to  loose 
containers': 
(13)  (a)  The beheading of the tallest spy occurred at noon 
(b)  The beheading of the tallest spy surprised us. 
If the king and the tallest spy happen to be the same person, then it follows from (13a) that 
The  beheading  of  the  king  occurred  at noon.  But  certainly  The  beheading  of  the  king 
surprised us does not follow from (13b). 
Vendler's  description  of the  meanings  of  perfect  and  imperfect  nominals  and  their 
respective  containers  is  rather  vague,  but  he  clearly  suggests  that  a  category  distinction 
between events and facts or results forms the philosophical basis for these empirical findings. 
Events are taken  to  somehow be related  to the meaning of perfect  nominals,  and  facts or 
results  to the meaning of imperfect nominals.  We  think  it  is  fair  to  interpret  Vendler  as 
claiming  that  the  relationship  between  the  nominals  and  their  respective  containers  is 
determined  by  this  category  distinction, but  it  is  certainly  unclear  (a matter  of  debate?) 
whether  he  wants  the  other  findings  to  be  interpreted  in  this  way  or  as conditioned  by 
structural (i.e. syntactic) properties of English. 
Schachter suggests that some gerunds -  his gerundive nominals behave  like names. 
"To return to gerundive nominals, I would claim that gerundive nominals without initial possessives or 
other determiners are also class names naming a type of activity in which one can participate, a type of 
condition, etc." (Schachter 1976: 215) 
If  we assume that  imperfect nominals are  like names, then  this  assumption accounts 
immediately for the lack of determiners in such phrases since names can in general not occur 
with determiners6. This assumption is further supported by the following observation from 
Pullum (1991): 
(14)  *his leaving her that you predicted 
Neither  Acc-ing  nor  Poss-ing  gerunds  tolerate  restrictive  relative  clauses.  One  further 
observation  supporting  Schachter's  proposal  is  that  Ing-of  nominals  can  sometimes  be 
pluralised but Acc-ing and Poss-ing gerunds definitely can't. The following example is from 
Poutsma (1923). 
(15)  He ignored the sayings and doings of the ladies of his family, 
Observations from Abney (1987: 244), moreover, show that perfect  and imperfect nominals 
also differ in their ability to participate in N-bar deletion. For instance, an ellipsis with a Poss- 
ing construction as in  (16a) is bad, while it is possible with an Ing-of gerund and a narrow 
container as shown in (16b). 
'  The examples are from Parsons (1990). 
" In many languages - for example German - the definite article can occur with proper names; ie.  rler Prter is 
grammatical. But note that this is restricted to the definite article (ein Prter is out). In some languages the 
definite article even functions as a kind of nominaliser. An example is ancient Greek (see Koptjevskaja-Tamm 
1993). For a more careful discussion of this topic see Hamm (1999). An inshuctive discussion of the historical 
development of the English gerundial system is Hindsill (2001). Frltz Hamm /  Mzchzel van Lambulgen 
(1 6)  (a)  *John's fixing the sink was surprising, and Bill's was more so. 
(b)  John's fixing of the sink was skillful, and Bill's was inore so. 
Abney claims that the gerund John's frxing  of the sink is ambiguous and can either refer to the 
manner in which John fixed the sink - called the Act-reading by Abney - or the fact that John 
fixed the sink (Fact-reading). N-bar deletion is only possible under the Act-reading. 
Of course Abney does not develop a formal semantics for his Fact- and Act-readings.  In 
his  work  these  concepts are just  labels  which  are  used  to  name  the  intuitive  reason  for 
observations  like the one above. In the following pages we will  develop  a formal theory 
which allows us to give a precise reconstruction of Abney's notions. His Act-reading will be 
described  in  terms of event-types  and his Fact-reading  in  terms  of Yuents.  These formal 
concepts are introduced in section 4. 
Finally,  we note  the  following  examples of  iterated  nominalisations,  a phenomenon 
which was not observed by Vendler. 
(1 7)  (a)  John's supporting his son's not going to church 
(b)  John's improving his singing 
(c)  John's watching the dog's playing 
(d)  my discovering her not leaving 
(e)  his discussion of John's revealing the secret 
We  are  interested  in  these  examples  because  the  negation  in  say  (17a)  seems  to  have 
antonymic force, and all examples seem to be factive in the sense that they presuppose that 
the fact expressed by the embedded nominal holds. For instance (17a) implies that John's son 
is not going to church.  . 
In  this paper only the Act- and Fact-readings of gerunds are considered. The habitual or 
generic reading of a gerund like euting apples will be neglected7. 
3  Syntax 
In this section we will briefly mention Abney's  syntactic analysis of English gerunds. Our 
main  purpose  here is to show that  the  formal  apparatus we will develop  in the following 
sections  allows  a  strictly  compositional  interpretation  of  the  discussed  nominalisations. 
However,  although  we will  be  concerned with  Abney's  work, we want  to  stress that  the 
proposed interpretation process is not tied to a specific syntactic framework. For example, in 
Hammlvan  Lambalgen  (2000) we  show how  to  interpret  Pullum's  GPSG-based theory  of 
nominal gerund phrases  (Pullum  1991) which  are  Abney's  Poss-ing  gerunds in  a  strictly 
compositionaal way too. 
Abney's  account  is  based  on  a  conservative  extension  of classical  X'-theory.  It  is 
conservative in the sense that it does not eliminate any inferences of X'-theory on the phrasal 
level. Abney's approach differs from the classical theory only in so far as he assumes that the 
function of the affix -ing is to convert a verbal category into a nominal one. The essence of 
his  analysis  is then  that  the differences in the  structures of the  various  types  of English 
gerunds reduce to the question of where in the projection  path  of the verb this conversion 
takes place.  It is presumed that -ing can only be adjoined to the lexical category V and to the 
maximal projections VP and 1P. Furthermore, it is assumed that this abstract morphological 
element does not have a syntax of its own in the sense that it does not project any structure. 
This assumption allows X'-theory to be kept intact at the phrasal level. 
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If -ing is sister of IP, the resulting s-structure is that of Acc-ing. Abney assumes that at 
LF the verb sing is raised to ing. 
ini 
A  A 
Y  DP 
sing  the Muvseilluise 
In Pass-ing gerunds, -ing is sister of VP, and in Ing-of structures ing occupies the lowest place 
in the tree. Therefore, we arrive at the following two structures. 
sing 
Ing-of 
We will slightly deviate from Abney's analysis here in assuming two different -ings -  one, 
-ing, for Acc-ing and Pass-ing and the other, -ingo/,  for Ing-of structures. The reason for this is 
that the semantic effect of -ing in Ing-of gerunds is slightly different from the effect -ing has 
for the other types of gerunds. Following Chon~sky  (1981) in assuining a rule of of-insertion, 
the  following  syntactic  structure  for  Ing-of  gerunds  will  be  the  input  for  semantic 
interpretation. Fritz Hamm /  Michiel vcfn La~nhnigen 
4  Formal Framework 
The literature contains several formalisms for the semantics of events. A prominent example 
is Parsons (1990). But in this tradition, predicates like Hold or Cul which  are intended to 
intuitively capture distinctions between different kinds of eventualities are not  axiomatised 
and therefore formally empty. The literature in artificial intelligence also contains formalisms 
for reasoning  about events, which have their roots in planning  and  are axiomatised.  It has 
been  suggested  several  timesX  that  such formalisms might  be useful  for  the  semantics of 
natural  language, altho~~gh  Hamdvan Lambalgen (2000) seems to be the first paper where 
the act~lal  computations are done. 
We will work with a variation of an event-calculus developed in Shanahan (1997) and 
combine this formalism with  a type-free logical  system"roposed  by  Feferman  (1984). By 
cornb~ning  the  two  systems,  we  derive  a  theory  of  reification  for  different  kinds  of 
eventualities. This will be explained in the next two sections. 
4.1  Event Calculus 
The event-calculus is a many-sorted first order logic with sorts for individuals real numbers, 
representing time, fluents and event-types marking the beginning and end of fluents. Fluents 
can be thought of as time-dependent properties; i.e. we expect that they hold or don't hold at a 
certain time  t.  Event-types  are objects  which  initiate  or terminate  the  life  of  a  fluent.  In 
contrast to fluents, these objects don't hold but rather happen. 
Given this ontology, the following choice of basic predicates seems natural. We want to 
be able to say that fluents are initiated and terminated by events, or that a fluent held or was 
true at the beginning of time. Iff  is a variable over fluents, e a variable over events, and t a 
variable over time points, we may write the required predicates as 
Intuitively Inrtmlly(f) means that at the beginning of time fluent f holds. I-iappens(e, t) says 
that event-type e takes place at time t. Therefore, the palr (e, t) may be thought of as a specific 
X  For instance in Steedman (1997). 
" Standard logical system distinguish strictly between the set of terms and the set of formulas. Only terms are 
allowed as arguments in formulas. For example if P(x) and Q(y) are formulae formed from one place predicates 
P, Q and variables x, y an expression like P(Q(y)) is not well-fornied. Type-free systems contain means to 
interpret expressions like the above. In the system presented in section 2.2 this is achieved via an abstract form 
of Godelisation. For.rnnl  Fozmdations for Semantic Theories ~f'Nuininnlisation 
event-token  and the set  Huppens  as the  set of  event-tokens. Initiutes(e, f,  t)  encodes one 
possible action of an event-type. It is true at time t if event-type e causes the time dependent 
property f to hold. It is assumed that f does not hold at t. Ternzincltes(e, f, t) is the converse of 
Initiates. It encodes the other possible action of an event-type. This predicate says that at time 
t event-type e brings it about that fluent f ceases to hold. It is assumed that f holds at t. 
The predicate HoldsAt(f, t) says intuitively that time dependent property f holds at time t 
or is true at time t. The combination with Feferman's type-free system will turn HoldsAt into 
a truth predicate. 
Shanahan's  calculus also contains the predicates  Trujectovy and Releclses, which will 
not  be  used  for  the  analysis  of  nominalisations.  We  therefore  present  here  a  simplified 
axiomatisation of his  calculus.  The two  additonal predicates  allow  continous change and 
changing partial  objects to be  modelled. In Hammlvan Lambalgen  (2000) they are used  to 
provide an axiomatised account for the semantics of the progessive. 
We introduce two special predicates for f-relevant events.  Clippeel(t1,  f, t2)  expresses 
that there is a terminating  event between tl  and tz;  the second predicate Declipped(t,, f, t2) 
expresses that there is an initiating event between ti  and t2. Therefore Clipped(t1, f, t2)  says 
that between tl and tl some event happened which caused f not to hold. Declipped(t1, f, tz) is 
the opposite of Clippecl(tl, f, tz). It says that between tl  and tz  an initiating event for fluent f 
occurred. 
The axioms of the event calculus given below are a modified and simplified version of 
Shanahan (1997). In the following, all variables are assumed to be universally quantified. The 
set of axioms of the event calculus will be abbreviated by EC. 
Axiom 1  Initiully(f) A 7Clipped(0,  f, t) -t HolclsAt(f, t). 
Axiom 2  Huppens(e, t) A Initiutes(e, f, t) A t < t' A 7Clipped(t,  f, t') -t 
HolclsAt(f, t'). 
Axiom 3  Happens(e, t) A Termznates(e, f, t) A t < t' A ~Decl~ppecl(t,  f,  t') -3 
,HolclsAt(f,  t'). 
Axiom 4  Huppens(e, s) A t < s < t' A Ternzinates(e, f, s) +  Clippecl(t, f, t') 
Axiom 5  Hc~ppens(e,  s)  A t < s < t' A Initiutes(e, f, s) 4  Declippecl(t, f, t') 
Let us first explain Axiom 2 (Axiom 1 is similar). This axiom says that if at time t an event e 
happened  which  initiated  a  fluent  f and, moreover,  if between  t  and  t' nothing interfered 
which terminated the life off, then we know that at time t' fluent f still holds. Axiom 3 treats 
the parallel case for a fluent not holding at a time t'. Axiom 4 and 5 constrain the meanings of 
the fluent relevant predicates  Clipped(t, f, t')  and Declippecl(t, f, t'). For instance, Axiom 4 
informs us that if an event happens between t and t' which terminates the life of fluent f, then 
this fluent is clipped between t and t'. 
In the usual set-up of the event calculus, it is only said that HolclsAt is a truth predicate; 
the defining axioms for the truth predicate are lacking since the language of the event-calculus 
does not allow the characteristic truth axiom to be stated. To see this more clearly, consider a 
formula q(a) with a temporal parameter a. We would like to map this formula to a fluent f and 
then formulate the following truth axiom: Fritz Hamm /Michiel van Lainhalgen 
However the language of the event-calculus does not have the means to  do this.  What we 
need  is a method to  transform  formulas into terms. This is termed  reification  in Artificial 
Intelligence.  Before  developing the necessary  machinery,  let  us  first  give  some linguistic 
reasons -  due to Chierchia (1989) -why such an operation of reification seems to be required. 
Consider: 
(18)  (a)  Being home is nice. 
(h)  To be home is nice. 
(c)  John is nice. 
Semantically Johrz, the gerund heing home and the infinitive to he home are arguments of the 
propositonal function is nice. But this is not possible with finite verb phrases as in (20). 
(19)  (a)  *Are home is nice. 
(b)  *Is home is nice. 
Chierchia therefore  adheres  to  the  old  Fregean  idea  of  conceiving of  a  function both  as 
something which requires an argument, and as an object. In the examples above, the object 
correlate of the (propositional) function are home is the gerund being home or the infinitive to 
he  home.  Since these  are both  of the  same semantic  type  as the proper name John,  the 
examples in (18) are predicted to be acceptable. By contrast the expressions aye home and is 
home  in  (19)  are  of a  higher  (function)  type  and  for  this  reason  are  not  acceptable  as 
arguments of the propositional function is nice. This argumentation explains the observations 
in (18) and  (19). The gerund and the infinitive here are the reified  versions of their finite 
pendants. 
4.2  Feferman Theories 
Let Lo be a first order language and So  be a theory formulated in Lo. We assume that So admits 
a pairing scheme. This means that we reqire Lo to contain a constant 0, two unary  function 
symbols rrl and rr2 and a binary function symbol rr for which we will write (,).  Furthermore we 
assume that SO  proves 
Given a model Mo of So,  .rr  will be interpreted as a pairing function, i.e. as a function which 
maps an element of the cartesian product M x  M to an element of M in such a way that the 
components can be recovered via the functions rrl and x2. We can now use induction to define 
the coding of n-tupels for arbitrary n. These requirements suffice to define an abstract form of 
Godel numbering. We will henceforth write (9)  for the Godel number of cp in Lo  and possible 
extensions thereof. 
Now  let  cp  be  a  formula  with  free  variables  among  01 ,...,  ok,y~  ,...,  y,,.  The  term 
(((p),yI  ,..., y,,,) in  Lo contains contains oi  ,...,  ok  as bound variables and yl  ,..., y,, as free variables 
or parameters. The following definition makes sense: 
Definition  1  (p[6i ,..., Bk,yi  ,..., y,]  =  ((cp),yl,  ..., y,,).  The  variables  01  ,..., 01,  are  bound  by 
abstraction in this term. We will also use standard set theoretical notation for k = 1 and write 
for  (01  cp(o,y~  ,...,  y,,))  = cp[6,y1,...,y,,]. Fo~.~izal  Founrilrfions  for Semantic Thuorics of Nomizzalisut~on 
Let  us  see how to  use  this  notation  to  formalise  Chierchia's  examples. To  this  end,  let 
honze(o,a), and nice(o,a) be  predicates with  a temporal parameter  a. The sentence John  is 
home ut time u with j as a constant for John will therefore be formalised as: home(i,a). For the 
formal representation  of the gerund being home let us choose the term home[8,8].  Then the 
formula nice(home[6,i],t) is a well formed expression representing the sentence Being home 
is nice at time t.  Since are home would be rendered as home(o,a)  we get the unacceptable 
representation  nice(honze(o,a),t)  for  (]!))(a).  The  representation  is  unacceptable  because 
honze(o,a) is not a tern1 aid can therefore not occur as argument of the predicate nice. This 
accounts for the difference between (1 8) and (19). 
We now add "truth  predicates"  T,,  to  Lo  and extend the original  system  So  by truth 
axioms, thereby forming an enriched system S. The intuitive meaning of T,,( xl,  ...,  x,,,z) is that 
the tuple (xl,  ..., x,)  satisfies the formula coded by z. The following axiom  scheme therefore 
makes sense. 
Axiom 6  Tn(x~,...,xl,,  cp[61 ,...,~~,YI,...,Y~I)  *  T(~I  ,...JII,YI,...,YI~) 
Special cases of the above axiom scheme are: 
For m = 0 and cp[] = (cp), this results in the famous Tarskian scheme: 
For  TI,  we  get  the  set theoretic  principle  known  as  comprehension,  which  is of special 
importance in this paper since it will turn out that TI  = HollsAt. 
This shows that for Ti  we may as well write  G.  Before we proceed, let us  give a concrete 
example to demonstrate how T,  works. Assume again that cp(a) is a fonnula with a temporal 
parameter a, say hurnCj, the house, a) which is the formal representation  of the proposition 
John burns the house at time a. Let  us formalise the imperfect  nominal derived  from this 
proposition -  John's burning the house -  via the term burnlj, the house,  81.  This term is 
allowed as an argument of Ti or of HoldsAt. From the axioms of Feferman's calculus we thus 
derive: 
(21)  HolclsAt(hurn~,  the house, 81, t) e  huvnCj, the house, t) 
Intuitively John $ huvnirzg the house holds at a certain time t if and only if the proposition 
John  burns the house at tlme t is true. This explains the observation that although imperfect 
nominals are not propositions they are nevertheless somewhat proposition-like. Terms that are 
allowed as arguments of HoldsAt are proposition-like in other respects too. For example, for 
those fluents which can be defined in Lo, we can freely form conjunctions, disjunctions and 
negations according to the following recipe: 
(22)  HoldsAt(fl A fi, t) ct  HoldsAt(fl,  t) A HollsAt(fi, t) (similarily for v) Fritz Humm / Michiel von Lambalgen 
However, for (23) it is crucial that the fluents are definable in Lo.  Without this restriction, 
iteration  of the HoldAt-predicate would  lead  to  a version of Russell's  paradox.  In order to 
avoid  such paradoxes, Fefennan splits the  T-predicates into a positive  and a negative part, 
thereby interpreting the T-predicates by pairs (T,T') where T contains the extension and T the 
anti-extension of the respective predicate. The two are required not to overlap but are allowed 
to  have gaps; i.e. there may be (codes 00 formulas which are neither in  T nor in  T'.  This 
causes T' to behave like an antonym; i.e. we have 
TAT'=O  and 
T'+  YT  but not vice versa! ! 
This property of the calculus is important for the analysis of iterated nominalisations. To see 
this more clearly, consider again the iterated imperfect nominalisation John's supporting his 
son j.  not going to church. This expression presupposes that John's son is indeed not going to 
church. Moreover, it is clear that the negation in the embedded nominal has the force of an 
antonym. It is not classical negation but means that John's son refrains from going to church. 
Let  us  write j  for John, s for John's  son and c for church, so that the embedded imperfect 
nominal receives the following logical representation: 
Now suppose that in order to account for the observed factivity the verb support is translated 
as: 
Under  these assumptions the sentence John supports his son's tzot  goitzg to church will be 
represented as follows: 
Transforming  this  proposition  into  a  term  again  we  finally  arrive  at  the  above  iterated 
nominalisation. 
SUPPORm, lgoing[s,  c, 81, 61 
This term can occur as an argument of a loose container as in John's supporting his son's not 
going to church  wcls  considered hy many u severe mistake. But now observe the following 
equivalences: 
HoldsAt(SUPPORilj,  7going[s,  c, 81, 61,  t) H SUPPORTCj, lgoing[s,  c, 81, t) tt 
Hold~At(~going[s,  c, 21, t) A supportCj, -going[s,  c, B], t) tt 
IHoltlsAt(going[s,  c, $1, t) A supportCj, 7going[s,  c, 21, t) 
These equivalences show that a negative occurrence is in the scope of HoldsAt, which means 
that 7HoltEsAt(going[s,  c, B], t) has to be interpreted by HoldsAt'(going[s, c, B], t) which is 
T,'(going[s,  c,  21,  t).  This  accounts  for  the  antonymic  force  of  the  embedded  negated 
imperfect nominal his son's not going to church in a completely systematic way. 
An important feature of Feferman's calculus is that it limits the demonstrated partiality 
to the system S proper. To be more precise, Feferman proves a theorem which says that if So 
is a consistent system then there exists an extension S which contains truth axioms and which 
is conservative over So. Forrnnl Fozmilfltionsfbr Senzunfic Theories o/'Nominnli.satioit 
"Conservative" here means that  the  expanded  system S does  not  touch  the  entailment 
relation of the system So. For instance, if we choose classical predicate logic as So, negation 
behaves classically for expressions from the system So. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in 
mind that negations with Iterations of the HoldsAt-predicate always have antonymic force. 
Although  Feferman's  calculus  allows  to  introduce  set-like  objects  $[a],  which  are 
usually  written  (oQ(o)},  it  is important to note that  the axlom of extensionality  in general 
fails; i.e. we do not have: 
Feferman's calculus, therefore, is a genuinely intensional calculus in which the identity of the 
objects $[6] and y1[6] is not determined by their extensions. 
To summarise, we have found a method to turn a formula cp  into a term (cp),  which is 
allowed as an  argument of the HoldsAt-predicate. Therefore, the combination  of the event- 
calculus with Feferman's type-free system permits the development of the required theory of 
reification.  We  have  already  shown  how  the  combined  theory  allows  denotations  for 
imperfect  nominals to  be  defined. But  what  about perfect  norninals?  The  task  here is to 
describe  terms  which  are  event-like  and  clearly  distinguished  from  the  proposition-like 
fluents. Since event-types don't contain temporal parameters, we choose to represent perfect 
nominals as 3a.cp[x,a], where x is a tuple of variables and a is a time parameter. To illustrate 
this definition, consider again the formula burn(x, the house, a). The formal representation of 
the perfect nominal burning ofthe  house is the term 3a.hurn[x, the house, a]. This term is 
allowed to occur as argument of the Happens-predicate, but it is not of the right sort for the 
HoldsAt-predicate  since the temporal parameter  is bound by the existential quantifier. This 
also explains why event-types are not proposition-like entities, because the Happens-predicate 
is not a truth predicate and there is, therefore, no direct relationship between event-types and 
the corresponding propositions. 
Hence we have arrived at the following two definitions: 
Definition 1 If  cp(x,a) is a formula, the event-type generated by cp is the term 3a.cp[x,a] 
Definition 2 The denotation of an imperfect nominal deriving fro111 a formula cp(x,a)  is the 
term cp[x,i]. 
Event-tokens may be obtained from event-types by means of the Happens-predicate. 
An event-token thus is a pair consisting of an event-type and a time related by the Happens- 
predicate. 
Let us briefly repeat the general idea of reification. Extensionally we can conceive of the 
denotation  of a  predicate  as a  function  from  a  tuple  of  arguments  to  a  truth  value.  For 
instance, go(x, y, a) assigns 1 or 0 to individuals x, y and a time a. Reification changes the 
values of such a function. Instead of truth values, the reified formulas 3a.go[x, y, a] and go[x, 
y, ?I] will denote two kinds of eventualities, the first event-types and the second fluents. These 
eventualities  are  distinguished  by  two  predicates  of  the  axiomatised  event  calculus: the 
HoldsAt-predicate,  which  says that  a fluent holds  at  a  certain  time  t,  and  the  Happens- 
predicate, which  tells  us  that  an  event-type  happens  at  a  time  t.  The  first  predicate  is a 
generalised truth predicate; i.e. it satisfies the equivalence HollsAt(go[x, y, 21,  t) e  go(x, y, t) 
for fluent term go[x, y, 21. Hence, it mirrors the relationship between fluents and propositions. Fritz Hanlm / Mzchiel van Lnmbalgen 
The  second  predicate  is  not  a  truth-predicate,  It  allows  only  event-types  and  times  as 
arguments.  The  combined  formal  methods  allow  us  to  generate  objects  which  are 
distinguished  via  the  axioms  of the  event-calculus.  These objects can then  be used  for a 
detailed description of the semantics of two kinds of nominalisations. 
5  Applications 
In the following section we will discuss some applications of the developed  formal system. 
We will first show how to interpret the syntax trees from section 3 in a strictly compositional 
way. 
5.1  Compositionality 
We will  develop  a  detailed  interpretation  for only  one  syntactic  analysis. The necessary 
modification for the other trees  are obvious. Let us consider Abney's  analysis of Poss-ing 
gerunds. 
A!  Jo n's 
AP 
ing  -P 
sing the dcrrseilla~se 
Assume  that  the  verb  sing is represented  by sing(x,  y,  a),  where  a  is  again  a  temporal 
parameter.  The  VP  sing the  Marseillaise  is  formed  in  the  usual  way  by  applying  the 
propositional function corresponding to sing to the object the Mauseilaise. Let us write m for 
the NP the Marseillaise. The VP is therefore represented by sing(x, m,  a).  So far there is 
nothing new. The semantic function of the abstract morphological element ing  is reification. 
Syntactically,  ing  transforms  a  V-projection  into  an  N-projection.  The  corresponding 
semantic operation is the transformation  of the propositional function sing(x, m, a) into the 
fluent  valued  function sing[x, m,  21.  The  last  step  consists  in  applying the  fluent  valued 
function to the object John (j), which results in the fluent object singlj, m,  %I, which is the 
semantic representation of the Poss-ing gerund John's singing the Marseillaise. In accordance 
with  the  observations  from  section  2.1 John's  is  not  analysed  as  a  determiner  in  this 
construction but is treated in the same way as John in Acc-ing gerunds. 
Acc-ing gerunds are interpreted  similarly. The only difference  is that  the  reification 
process applies to sing(j, m, a), which is in accordance with Abney's analysis. The result is 
again the fluent object singti, m, ?I]. 
The compositional interpretation of Ing-of gerunds preceeds in the same way with one 
additional complexity, however. This complexity concerns the role of determiners, which can 
occur with perfect nominals but not with imperfect nominals. Note that John's is considered a 
determiner when this expression occurs as part of perfect nominals but not when it occurs as 
part of imperfect nominals. Formal Ff~u~zrlations  for Semantic Tlieories of  Nominoli.sation 
5.2  Verbal Contexts and Determiners 
Before  we analyse determiners  we have  to  fix  the  denotations  of the  verbal  contexts  or 
containers in Vendler's  terminology. If we stipulate the denotation of a loose container like 
surprised us to be a set of fluents, then according to the analysis so far, we predict that the 
sentence 
John's singing the Marseillaise surprised us. 
is  semantically  well-formed  since  the  imperfect  nominal  John's singing the  Marseillaise 
denotes a fluent object which may well be an element of the set surprised us. We have two 
possibilities  for choosing denotations for narrow containers:  sets of event-types or sets of 
event-tokens. In both cases we predict that the sentence 
John's singing the Marseillaise took place at noon. 
is semantically not well formed since a fluent can neither be an element of a set of event-types 
nor an element of a set of event-tokens. But on closer inspection, the second option seems to 
be more appropriate because narrow containers can be temporally modified. Since the time 
parameter of event-types is bound by an existential quantifier, there is no way to temporally 
modify event-types. By contrast, event-tokens, being pairs of event-types and times, can be 
readily  modified  by  temporal  operators.  Therefore,  if  we choose  (sets  of)  event-types  as 
denotations  for  perfect  nominals  and  (sets  of)  event-tokens  as  denotations  of  narrow 
containers, their behaviour with respect to temporal  modification  is explained. Specifically, 
we predict that temporal modification of perfect nominals is not possible, which is supported 
by the above-mentioned fact that the form having cooked of  the dlnner is not acceptable. A 
further  advantage  of choosing  different denotation  types  for perfect  nominals  and  narrow 
containers  is that  we may  assume  that  it  is possible  to  negate narrow  containers without 
assuming that negation of perfect nominals is possible too. We can therefore assume that the 
negation of narrow containers is complementation with respect to the set of event-tokens, i.e. 
with respect to the set Happens. This explains the following two observations: 
The singing of the song didn't occur at noon. 
*John's kicking the cat didn't occur at noon. 
The second  fact  follows  since  didn't  occur  at noon  denotes  a  set  of event-tokens - the 
complement of occur clt  noon  with respect to Happens -  which may not contain the fluent 
John j. kicking the cat. In order to explain the first, we have to analyse the role of determiners. 
Since perfect nominals denote sets of event-types and narrow containers denote set of event- 
tokens, the task of determiners is to relate the two sets. This relationship  can be established 
with the help of the Happens-predicate of the  event-calculus. Under  these  assumptions,  a 
sentence like Every singing ofthe aria tookplace at noon will be formalised as follows (here 
a abbreviates the NP the aria): 
Vx,s(Happens(3t.sing[x, a, t],s) +  tookpluce at  noon(3t.sing[x, a, t], s)) 
On  this analysis, the licensing conditions for determiners is the positive occurrence of the 
Happens-predicate  in  the  restrictor.  This  immediately  explains  why  imperfect  nominals 
cannot  occur  with  determiners,  because  fluents  like  hreak[x,  r,  81  are  not  allowed  as 
arguments of the Huppens-predicate. Therefore, an expression like 
every breaking the record Fritz H<~rnm  / Michiel von Lr~rnhnlgeii 
is not acceptable. 
In order to give a strictly compositional analysis of Abney's analysis of Ing-of gerunds 
we have to develop a semantic representation  for the meanings of determiners. We will use 
lambda notation to unambigously denote functions. The general scheme for determiners that 
occur with perfect nominals is then: 
hPhQ Det x,t(Hczppens(P(x), t), Q(P(x), t)) 
This  scheme is  best  explained  by  working  out  a  concrete  example.  Suppose then  that 
hx3t.sing[x, a, t] represents the perfect nominal singing offhe aritr. The determiner Every = 
hPhQ Every x,t(Huppens(P(x), t), Q(P(x), t)) applied to this nominal gives: 
hQ Every x, t(Happens(hx3tsing[x a, t](x), t), Q(hxjt.sing[x, a, t](x), t), which reduces to 
hQ Ever?, x, t(Happens(3t.sing[x, a, t], t), Q(3t.sing[x, a, t], t). This function, when applied to 
the narrow container tookpluce at noon, results in Every x, t(Happens(3t,sing[x, a, t], t), took 
place at noon(3t.sing[x,  a, t], t), which  is the generalised  quantifier representation  of the 
above formula. Therefore, Abney's syntactic analysis of Ing-of gerunds can be interpreted in a 
strictly compositional way too"'. 
To summarise we have  arrived  at the  following denotation  types  for perfect  versus 
imperfect nominals and narrow versus loose containers: 
perfect norninals  sets of event-types 
imperfect nominals  fluents 
narrow containers  sets of event-tokens 
loose containers  sets of pairs consisting of fluents and times 
But what about a sentence like John's breaking ofthe  records ssuprised us, where a perfect 
nominal occurs as an argument of a loose container? 
5.3  Coercion and Intensionatity 
Vendler observed that perfect nominals tend to be interpreted like imperfect ones when they 
occur as arguments of loose containers. Thus, a paraphrase of the sentence The collapse of  the 
Germans is unlikely is That the Germans collapsed is unlikely. No  such paraphrase exists for 
The collapse ofthe  Germans was gradual for the narrow container wcrs graclual. 
An informal description of the meaning of the sentence The collcrpse ofthe  Germans is 
unlikely might run as follows: What is unlikely is the fact that an event characterised by the 
noun  colltrpse  of  tlze  Germans  is  happening.  This  intuition  can  be  cast  into  a  precise 
definition. 
Definition 3  Let  e be an  event-type; then there exists a canonical fluent  f associated to e 
defined by f := Huppens[e,B]. 
Let us demonstrate this definition with an analysis of the sentence The heheuding of  the king 
surprised us. The formula representing this sentence is: 
The x,s(Huppen.s(3a.helzr~ltl[x,fkr  king, a], s), surpri.sed us(Happms[3a.behead[x,the  king, a], 81, s)) 
"'We refer the reader to Hanu~dZimnlem~ann  (2002) and Westerstihl(1989) for a detailed analysis of other 
determiners like the,  John :\ etc. and for the analysis of quantifiers in object positions. Formal Foundutio~zs  for Semuntic Theories of'N(~minrrIisution 
An  intuitive paraphrase of the  formula is: Given that  a unique  event  characterised  by the 
phrase beheading of  the king happened  this very fact surprised us. Determiners here function 
similarily to detenniners which relate nominals to narrow containers; however, in the case of 
coerced  readings  detenniners relate  event-types  not  to  event-tokens  but  to  the  canonical 
fluents associated with them. 
The  type  of  coercion just  encountered  is  of  importance  for  the  difference between 
intensional and extensional contexts too. As already observed, narrow containers are typical 
extensional contexts while loose containers are in general intensional contexts. Thus, if the 
king and the fanlous co~nmander  are one and the same person, then 
The beheading of the king occurred at noon 
implies The beheatling of  the famous  communder occurred at noon and vice versa. No such 
mutual dependence is observed in the case of The beheading of  the king surprised us and The 
beheading of  the  famous commander surprised us. 
Since the nominal beheading o/"the king is represented by 3a.beheatl[x, the king, a] and 
beheading  of  the famous  commander  by  3a.behead[x, fanzous  contmunder,  a]  they  are 
different  according  to  the  intensional  set  up  of  the  Feferman  calculus.  Therefore  The 
beheading of  the king surprised us may be true without The beheading of  famous  commander 
surprised us being true as well and vice versa. But now we have to face a problem. The same 
holds  for the pair  The  beheading oj-the king occurred at noon  and  The beheacling of  the 
famous  commander  occurred at noon.  However,  as  observed  these  sentences  imply  one 
another. 
To solve this problem note that it seems reasonable to assume that event-types which are 
derived from equivalent formulas happen at the same time. They are extensional in this sense. 
The effect is captured formally by the following axiom: 
Axiom 7  Let $ and y! be logically equivalent formulas, then 
Hrrppens(3a.$(x, a), t) H Happens(3a.y!(x, a), t). 
This is not yet sufficient to guarantee extensional equivalence of the pair The beheading ofthe 
king occurrerl rtt noon and  The beheading of  the famous  communder occurred at noon. The 
equivalence is arrived at by the following empirical hypothesis: 
Every narrow container is a Boolean coinbination of the Hc~ppens-predicate. 
Since the sentence The hehecldlng of  the king occurred at  noon is formalised as 
The X, s(Huppens(3a.beheud[x, the king, a], s),  occurred at  noon(3a.bel1ead[x, the king, a], s)) 
Axiom  7  and the empirical  hypothesis  plus the  assu~nption  that  the  king  and  the  famous 
commander are the same person force the two sentences to have the same truth value. 
Examples  for the use  of fluents  associated  with  event-types  more  involved  than  the 
intensional phrases above are provided by Cresswell's sentences. 
5.4  Negation of Event-Types 
Consider again the examples in (25) 
(25)  (a)  The non-arrival of the train caused consternation 
(b)  *the non-arrival of the train unexpectedly 
(c)  the unexpected non-arrival of the train Fritz Hamm / Michiel van Lamhulgen 
(d)  *The non-arrival of the train occurred at noon. 
(e)  Every non-arrival of a train causes consternation 
The problem  the  phrase non-arrival of  the  (a)  train  poses  is  that  it  exhibits  the  internal 
behaviour of a perfect nominal but the external behaviour of an imperfect nominal. Let us first 
consider the nominal arrive11  of  the (a)  truin. Although this is a derived nominal, we take it as 
an event denoting expression". Its translation is therefore 3a.arrive[x, t,  a], where t is short 
for the ((1)  truin. The probleln uow is to analyse the effect of 17on. The obvious representation 
of non-rrrrival ofthe train as 3a.~arrive[x,  t, a] seems to be out since this would turn non- 
arrival ofthe trrrin into an event-type, which would not help to explain the external behaviour 
of this expression, which is that of an imperfect nominal as shown by (25)(d). For a way out, 
consider  the  Happens-predicate  again.  Given  Happens(e,a),  we  can  forn~  the  negation 
,H~rppens(e,a) and then construct from this formula the fluent denoting term THappens[e,2]; 
intuitively  this term  denotes the fact that e didn't  happen. Let  us fix this observation as a 
definition. 
Definition 4 The fluent negation =e of an event-type e is defined by  se  := 7Huppens[e,2] 
With the help of definition 4, a possible logical representation of the crucial sentence pair The 
non-arrival ofthe  trrrin surprised us versus *The rzon-arrival of  the trcrin occurred at noon is 
now: 
(26)  The x, ~(~Huppens(3a.arrive[x,t,a],  s), surprised zis(=3a.rrrrii~e[x,t,a],  sf t, 
The x, ~(~Huppenfi(3a.urrive[x,t,a],  s), szirprised ~.s(~Happens[3a.arrive[x,t,a],  61, s) 
(27)  The x, ~(~Hupprns(3a.urrive[x,t,a],  s), occurveii at noo~z(=3a.~rrive[x,t,a],  s) ct 
The x, s(-Happens(3a.rln-ive[x,t,a],  s), occurred ut no0n(~Huppetrs[3a.u1-rive[x,t,a],B],  s) 
These formulas give a partial explanation for Cresswell's observations. First, the sentence The 
non-arrive11  ofthe  train occurrecl at noon is out because occurred as noon is a set of event- 
tokens,  and  the pair  (7Happens[3a.arrive[x,  t,  a], 61,  s) cannot be an element  of a set of 
event-tokens since ~Huppens[3a.c~rrive[x,  t, a], 61 is not an event-type but a fluent (recall that 
event-tokens are pairs of event-types and times). On the other hand, (7Huppens[3a.arrive[x, 
t, a], a],  S) may well be an element of surprised us since loose containers contain pairs of 
fluents and times. But there is still one problem left. 
The condition (IHcrppens(3a.arrive[x,  t, a], s) in the restrictor of determiners is not the 
licensing  condition  we  need  for  determiners.  Determiners  were  licensed  by  a  positive 
occurrence of the Happens-predicate in the restrictor. But suppose we introduce a negation - 
which maps even-types to event-types and which satisfies the following postulate: 
(28)  Ve(Happens(-e,  t) -t ~Happens(e,  t)) 
Postulate  (28) turns - into  an  antonymic negation.  Such a negation  seems to be required 
independently  because  of  the  Russian  nominalisations  negated  by  ne,  for  instance 
nesohljutlenie (not-respecting). With (28) we can now choose the following translations  for 
the sentences  The non-arrival  of  the  train surprised us  and  The  won-urrival  of  the  train 
occurred at  noon. 
''  This is in accordance with Vendler's observations that some derived nornlllals (like blizzard) are perfect 
norninals. For~~lnl  Fuunrlafionsfor Semnnfic Theories ufNominnlisotiu,~ 
The x, s(Hc1ppens(-3a.~1rnve[x,t,a],  s), surprzsed us(~Happens[3a.~1rr1ve[x,t,a],  61, s) 
The x, s(Happens(-3a.avnve[x,t,a],  s), occurred at  n0on(~Happens[3a,avnve[x,t,a],  61, s) 
These formulas satisfy the licensing conditions for the occurrence of determiners,  and (26) 
and (27) can be derived from clause (28). These formalisations explain the puzzling character 
of Cresswell's examples too because according to the above forn~ulas  two different kind of 
negations interact in a non-trivial way. 
However, we have to  face a further problem  now. As  already observed,  negation  in 
perfect nominals -  if it can occur at all -  is not classical logical negation. The question then is 
why the strengthening of (28) with (29), which introduces classical negation of event-types, is 
not allowed'? 
(29)  Ve(-Huppens(e,  t) +  Happens(-e,  t)) 
Before we go on investigating this particular problem, let us first see that it makes sense to 
introduce at least some Boolean connectives on the set of event-types. First, we observe that 
we can form conjunctions and disjunctions of perfect nominals. The following examples are 
acceptable and perfect nominals: 
(30)  (a)  John's breaking of the record and his winning of the race 
(b)  .lohn's breaking of the record or his winning of the race 
For the analysis of these examples disjunctions  and conjunctions  of event-tpes  seem to be 
required. It is easy to introduce such operations. First observe that if two formulas @,  are 
given, we can  form  new  event-types from  event-types  3a.$[x,a] and 3a.~l[x,a]  by setting 
3a.+[x,a] A  3a.q~[x,a]  := 3a.($ A v~)[x,a]  and similarily for 3a.$[x,a]  v 3a.y~[x,a].  However, 
since H~lppens  is not a truth predicate",  we do not know how these new terms behave with 
respect  to  this  predicate of the  event-calculus.  But  we  can  stipulate  proper behaviour by 
means of two axioms. 
Axiom 8  H~~ppens(e  A e',t) tt  Hqpens(e,t)  A Huppens(e',t) 
Axiom 9  Happens(e v e',t) tt  Huppens(e,t) v Huppetzs(e',t) 
The question now is whether there are any reasons to reject (29)? To answer this question, we 
have  to  give  a  brief  informal  sketch  of the  approach  to  computing  denotations  in  van 
LambalgedHamm 2001. 
In  this  paper, the  computation of  the  denotation  of  expressions  is viewed  as a  non- 
monotonic process which on the basis of the description of a concrete situation incorporating 
lexical information (an episode in the terminology of van LambalgedHamm 2001) delivers a 
minimal model  of the  situation. The  computation  process  is  given  by  a  constraint  logic 
program based on the axioms of the event calculus EC. Let us explain this in  more detail. 
An inference relation  is monotonic if it satisfies: r  cp;  then TuC  cp, where cp  is a 
formula and T,  C are sets of formulas. An inference relation  is non-monotonic if it is not 
monotonic.  So strengthening the  antecedents  preserves  a  given  inference  in  monotonic 
systems, but it may destroy such an inference in non-monotonic systems. 
Non-monotonic systems establish minimal models in the sense that nothing is assumed 
beyond  what  is  given  by  the  data.  The  algorithm  which  computes  denotations  always 
"Note  that this contrasts with the case of HoldsAf,  which is a truth predicate, Fritz Hrrmnz / Michiel vrrn  Lanzhal~en 
computes  a  minimal  model  compatible  with  the  present  data.  This  point  bears  some 
elaboration. Both monotonic and nonmonotonic reasoning start from the maxim: 
(MI  assume only what is given in the premises 
but they implement (M) in different ways. Non-monotonic reasoning takes (M) to mean: all 
existence  assumptions  beyond  those  required  by  the  premises  are  false;  by  contrast, 
monotonic reasoning interprets (M) as: suspend judgement on statements which do not follow 
(and whose negations do not  follow) from the premises. In  the interesting cases, these two 
interpretations of (M) can be reformulated as follows. In non-monotonic reasoning, people 
construct a minimal model, i.e. a model which makes everything false except the given data, 
of the premise (which is often unique); in monotonic reasoning, they must consider all models 
of the premises. We believe that  the  intension  or sense of an expression  can be profitably 
identified with an algorithm constructing such minimal  models.  For a precise definition of 
Frege's notion sense using algorithms for the construction of denotations in minimal models, 
see van LambalgenIHamm (2001). 
Let  us now  apply this  general  approach to  the problem  we  encountered  with  (29). 
Instead  of giving  a general proof, we will demonstrate the refutation  of (29) by way of a 
concrete example. 
Assume that n event-types are given and, further, that there is an episode which only 
mentions that event-type e happens at time t. What do we know about the minimal model M 
of this episode? 
Certainly, Happens(e, t) is true in M. Moreover, for all e, # e, -Happens(e,,  t) is true in 
M as well. Now suppose for some e,  # e and -e,  # e. Then we have that 7Huppens(ej, t) and 
~Huppens(-e,, t)  are true  in  M  since M  is a  minimal  model.  From  (29) we derive now: 
Ifuppens(-e;,  t) and Huppens(--e,,  t).  Therefore -e,  = e = --e,.  It  follows  from (28) and 
Huppens(--e,,  t) that 7Huppens(-ej,  t) which contradicts Huppensie, 1). 
This example demonstrates that (29) prevents the computation of denotations in minimal 
models. We therefore conclude that only antonymic negation, i.e. a negation satisfying (28), is 
compatible with event-types. 
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